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International risk sharing is an intertemporal utility maximizing process in which 
countries of different economic prospects engage in cross-border trade and 
financial asset transactions to mitigate impacts of idiosyncratic income shocks on 
consumption. Measuring the extent of international risk sharing (IRS) remains an 
open empirical question. This dissertation provides a new approach to measuring 
the extent of IRS for countries and conditions for the measure of consumption 
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Essay 1 : Literature Review 
 
1. The concept of international risk sharing 
Aggregate volatilities or risks refer to fluctuations in economic variables, e.g. consumption, gross 
domestic products, saving, investment, trade balance, exchange rate, and interest rates. Shocks 
originated from within and other countries are normally the cause of fluctuations of these variables 
in interconnected economies. Studying the extent of disconnection of these shocks and domestic 
aggregate fluctuations is an important branch in economic research and of practical meanings in 
making economic policies. 
Consumption risk sharing refers to an intertemporal utility maximization process in which 
economic agents attempt to reduce impacts of income shocks on consumption via directly 
engaging in an insurance contract or by buying and selling a variety of financial assets or securities 
on capital and credit markets. The former arrangement separates risk hedgers from risk takers, 
while the latter lets both parties exchange risks with each other. 
Risk sharing could be accomplished via within- or cross-country financial transactions.  Domestic 
risk sharing describes situations in which residents of a country try to reduce volatilities of their 
consumption by carrying out financial transactions with each other. For a country as a whole, 
domestic risk sharing alone is not sufficient to avoid consumption fluctuations as the process is 
still limited to the country’s own income. International risk sharing, on the other hand, describes 
processes in which countries of different income prospects would carry out international trade and 
financial transactions to share among them the income volatility risks affecting countries’ 




The foundation of the concept lies in the observation that economic agents attempt  to maintain 
stable consumption patterns over periods of turbulent economic activities. Leme (1984) and 
Scheinman (1984) observed that national consumption levels should move in a synchronized 
fashion when insurance against idiosyncratic national risk is possible, e.g. by using available 
financial instruments in international financial markets. Cochrane (1991) emphasized that 
consumption insurance is the cross-sectional counterpart of permanent income hypothesis in the 
sense that consumption of agents would not vary in response to idiosyncratic income shocks. 
Employing dynamic general equilibrium models to study transmissions of aggregate fluctuations 
across countries, international business cycle literature has shown that in an Arrow-Debreu 
complete-markets world, consumption growth correlation should be higher than output growth 
correlation. In this ideal world, country-specific output risk would be pooled, and hence domestic 
per capita consumption growth should not depend on country-specific income shocks. A 
theoretical definition of perfect international risk sharing can be shown as the equality of marginal 
utility between any two identical countries on any date and state of nature. Put it differently, the 
insurance process theoretically results in much stronger comovement of any two countries’ 
consumption growth than comovement of their income growth. Moreover, a country’s 
consumption growth should be theoretically independent from its country-specific income 
fluctuations if perfect insurance were achieved. 
2. A canonical model of international risk sharing 
2.1 The model 
The theoretical correlation result is derived based on the following model. Assume the world 
consists of a finite number of J  countries, 1...j J , each of which is represented by an economic 
agent who wishes to maximize a time-separable CRRA utility function. All economic agents share 
3 
 
a common state-independent discount factor   and rate of relative risk aversion  . There are a 
finite number of states S  at time t , 1...s S   , each of which has an occurrence probability of 
 ts   and   1ts s  . Each country is endowed with an exogenous stochastic amount  j ty s  
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The agent’s problem is solved using a social planner’s method that assigns a social weight to each 
agent (or country). 
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The first-order condition for each country j  at time t  is 





   (0.4) 
where t   is the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint at time t . 
Equation (0.4) holds for any country j   and any state and time. Hence, we will have 








    (0.5) 
Taking logarithm both sides of (0.5), we will have 
                                                 










    (0.6) 
There are three more unknowns in equation (0.6), but taking first difference both sides will 
eliminate them 
 1 1ln ln ln lnjt jt kt ktc c c c      (0.7) 
Aggregating equation (0.4) over countries and taking average of the result upon taking logarithm 
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Subtracting equation (0.8) from logarithm of equation (0.4)  
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Upon taking first difference of equation (0.9), we finally get 
 1 1ln ln
a a
jt jt t tc c c c      (0.10) 
The important economic result learned from equations (0.7) is there exists a perfect consumption 
growth correlation between any two countries. Equation (0.10)  also indicates a similar relationship 
between a country’s consumption growth and the world’s under perfect international risk sharing. 
In other words, a country’s consumption only reacts to aggregate consumption shock when risk 
sharing is complete. The literature frequently tests equation (0.7) and (0.10) for full international 
risk sharing. In short, under these above assumptions, national consumption growth should move 




It is important to observe that the tight movements of countries’ consumption growth and the 
world’s depend on several ideal assumptions for all countries, including complete markets with a 
single good for trade, no default possibility, identical agents, and risk averse coefficients. Without 
these assumptions, the theoretical conclusions would not hold. One important implicit assumption 
in the model is that the income prospect of each country is exactly the same, hence, countries have 
no restrictions on cross-border financial assets transactions. 
Another observation is that we cannot obtain the extent of risk sharing measured by pairwise 
correlations under imperfect risk sharing. Last but not least, international consumption risk sharing 
is different from domestic consumption smoothing, which could be done simply by saving one's 
own income or borrowing from relatives. In addition, the setup of the canonical model ignores 
possible reallocations of income across countries. In this perspective, receiving unilateral foreign 
aids cannot be considered as international consumption risk sharing (but consumption smoothing) 
as the aids does not represent contingent claims on the givers' income streams. 
3. Current empirical approaches and their limitations 
There are three main approaches used to measure international risk sharing in the literature. The 
first approach is based on general equilibrium dynamic economic models similar to one in Backus, 
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). The result from a benchmark world economy with complete markets 
shows that there would be a very high consumption correlation compared with income correlation. 
Specifically, Backus et al. (1992) found that consumption correlation is 0.88, compared with -0.21 
for income correlation from their model. Accounting for transport costs increases consumption 
correlation to 0.89 while decreasing income correlation to -0.5. The very high consumption 
correlation is interpreted as reflecting agent’s high ability of sharing risks internationally (Backus 
et al., 1992). The paper also found completely opposite results in observed data, a situation often 
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referred to as consumption correlation puzzle in the literature. Despite several papers have tried to 
explain the puzzle, e.g. due to unobserved preference shocks, non-traded goods or capital controls 
(Backus & Smith, 1993; Baxter, 2011; Kollmann, 1995; Lewis, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999; Obstfeld, 
1994; Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000; Stockman & Tesar, 1995; Tesar, 1993, 1995), a conclusive answer 
has not been found. 
Another approach is based on testing equation (0.10) and the observation that consumption growth 
should be independent from idiosyncratic income shocks. The test could be done by running the 
following regression2 jt i i t jtc C         and test if 1i  . The idea is similar to the 
correlation approach in the sense that under perfect risk sharing, idiosyncratic consumption 
fluctuations would be moving in a synchronized fashion with aggregate consumption fluctuation. 
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approach relies on number of countries in the sample, the weighting scheme to obtain aggregate 
consumption shock, and does not tell the extent of risk sharing when null hypothesis is rejected. 
A variant of the above regression form is the following ∆  ∆ ∆   , where the 
null hypotheses are  1 and 0   in observance that country-specific income shock does not 
affect consumption growth. This form, however, is not entirely compatible with the correlation 
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2  it tc C   indicates growth rate of country  i ’s (the world’s) consumption at time t .  
3 ,it ty C
r   is correlation between itc  and tC  
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has no supporting theoretical results. 
The panel regression it i it itc y        allows Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996)  to the 
extent of unshared risks shown by the coefficient  . The country’s degree of international risk 
sharing could be found by using the expression 1rs   , where the value of 1 comes from 
analytical results while deriving the regression form. The form could be used to measure the degree 
of risk sharing for a representative country in an economic union. The current economic situation 
in the European Union is a vivid example of how different macroeconomic fundamentals among 
countries are, even when they are in a monetary union. Failure to take into account some of the 
differences would yield uninterpretable results when using the approach to measure the extent of 
risk sharing for a specific country. 
4. Conclusions 
The theory of international risk sharing is based on a simple pooling equilibrium in which countries 
have the same income prospects, hence, their consumption fluctuations would be affected by world 
aggregate only. The optimal condition, while it is useful for pedagogical purposes, is failed to be 
found in observed data. Current empirical approaches rely on such optimal condition to form the 




Essay 2 : Measuring International Risk Sharing: The New Approach 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that an economic agent in one country can lessen the impact of a country-specific 
income shock on his consumption decision by engaging in asset transactions across countries. This 
so-called international risk sharing (IRS) is as fundamental as commodity transactions itself. 
However, it is not an easy task to empirically measure the extent of risk sharing in a particular set 
of countries. Recently some economists propose a simple approach to regress the growth rate of 
consumption of a particular country (over the world average) on the growth rate of income 
similarly constructed and then take the figure of one minus the estimated coefficient as a measure 
of international risk sharing4. We call it the regression measure of IRS. The idea behind this 
intuitively attractive approach is a simple pedagogical model of a pooling equilibrium. By putting 
income of all members together, each participant can enjoy a more stable consumption level over 
time than one can do individually. In such a case, the consumption growth fluctuation over the 
world average should come from the source not related to income fluctuations. Therefore, in full 
international risk sharing, the coefficient of the above regression must be close to zero, implying 
this measure of IRS close to 1. 
Unfortunately, the empirical results observed in many countless countries are not what is expected. 
The estimated measure is far from one even for a group of most advanced countries with massive 
international asset transactions. Two interpretations are possible. First, the degree of international 
risk sharing is actually low in reality even among advanced countries. Second, there is something 
                                                 
4 See Asdrubali et al. (1996), Arreaza, Sorensen, and Yosha (1998), A. M. Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009), Moser, 
Pointner, and Scharler (2004), Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007)  
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wrong with the proposed measure.  
We do not know with certainty which is the case. However, we suspect the second is more likely 
a culprit. In figure 1, we summarize the regression measure of IRS estimated from time series data 
of a variety of countries. What we find is quite disturbing. The estimated measures are not only 
much smaller than one but also are relatively larger in developing countries than in advanced 
countries. Actually our average estimates are 0.12 for industrial economies, 0.22 for the emerging 
economies, and 0.3 for the developing economies. If we take these numbers literally, we have to 
say that the developing countries are achieving higher degrees of risk sharing on average than the 
industrial countries, which is simply absurd. We call this incident of anomaly the “order reversal 
puzzle” of the regression measure of IRS. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop an empirical framework to obtain a more reasonable 
measure of IRS. To do so, we base our argument on the classical permanent income hypothesis 
(PIH) and develop an empirical model of the income and consumption processes in the form of 
bivariate unobserved component (UC) model. 
In our model, the income and consumption processes share a common random walk component, 
which is interpreted as the permanent income. Transitory shocks to income, which is interpreted 
as country-specific business cycle shocks, has a direct impact on consumption, but this effect can 
be partially or totally eliminated by international asset transactions. 
The extent of how independent the transitory component of consumption is from the transitory 
shock to income is, in our view, a reasonable measure of international risk sharing. In other words, 
our measure of IRS is nothing but an indicator of how much of the country specific business cycle 




It is found that the size of our measure of IRS estimated from data is close to one, and is larger in 
advanced countries than in developing countries. We also find that much smaller size of the 
regression measure of IRS is caused by the factors not directly related to the country’s risk sharing 
behavior. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: In the next section we develop an empirical framework 
to analyze risk sharing in the unobserved component model, and propose an alternative measure 
of IRS. Section 3 reports the empirical estimates of our UC measure of IRS and investigate the 
possible factors leading to the puzzling results of the regression measure of IRS. The last section 
provides a brief conclusion. 
2. A model of international risk sharing 
In this section, we first discuss the basic idea behind our empirical model, and then layout the 
mathematical detail of the model. 
2.1 Basic ideas 
To disentangle the empirical puzzle observed in the regression measure of IRS, we need to start 
our discussion with the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). Roughly speaking, each of the income 
and consumption processes is expressed as the sum of the permanent and transitory components. 
The two processes share the common random walk process as their permanent components. Their 
transitory components are separate stationary processes but can be correlated. 
Given this rough structure, the regression of the growth rate of consumption on that of income 
would pickup the common random walk shock of two processes, which produces the positive 
lower bound on the slope coefficient, or the upper bound on the proposed measure of international 
risk sharing. This upper bound could potentially be quite low and could yield misleading 
conclusions. More seriously, the proposed measure is apparently measuring something other than 
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international risk sharing. 
We now turn to an important aspect of the risk sharing across the national border in contrast with 
that within the border. 
The permanent and transitory components of income and consumption of a representative agent in 
one country’s economy are like the trend and cycle components of the country’s income and 
consumption. In the absence of international financial transactions an individual can share 
individual specific idiosyncratic risks with his fellow citizens but cannot avoid the country-specific 
business cycle risks because they are systematic within the country’s economy. 
The representative agent model is more or less justifiable in one country’s economy since at least 
the country specific shocks to the trend and cycle processes are likely to be shared by most 
members. This is partly because an economy is integrated to a large extent within a border and 
partly because the government can facilitate social programs including a variety forms of income 
transfers. 
When we look at income and consumption of different countries and allow cross border financial 
transactions, we need to have heterogeneous agent models. 
Financial markets integration alone cannot bring in the situation in which all different countries 
share a similar trend component of income and consumption unless the world is fiscally integrated 
and allows income transfers among countries. But the latter is politically quite difficult even within 
a small group of countries as witnessed by the current struggle of the EU nations. Given a current 
situation of the world, we assume that different countries have different long run income prospects 
or trend components and financial managements can only lessen an impact of the country specific 
business cycle on the transitory component of its consumption. Hence, what we expect from 
international risk sharing should not be an equalization of consumption growth rates among 
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countries, which is implied by a simple pooling equilibrium idea, but a consumption smoothing of 
each country along its specific trend line. A low income growth country cannot obtain a high 
growth rate of consumption through international financial arrangement but can lessen temporal 
fluctuations of consumption from its own (low) growth trend. 
2.2 Empirical framework 
We express income and consumption each as the sum of its permanent and transitory components 










where ty   and tc  are log of per capita income and consumption, respectively, and each of the 
permanent components is an I(1) and each of transitory components is an I(0) process. Also, 
assume innovations to the permanent and transitory components are uncorrelated for income and 
consumption 












where yt  and 
c
t   are zero mean auto-regressive processes of degree yp  and cp . 
We now make more particular assumptions in order to set up our empirical framework as follows. 
There are three assumptions 
1. An income shock has one-for-one impact on consumption 
2. There is a consumption shock with an exogenous origin 




We elaborate these assumptions in turn. The first assumption is simply manifestation of the 














      
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     
 (*) 
where yt  and  
c
t  are income and consumption shocks with   11 ... yy
py y
y pz z z        and 
  11 ... cc
pc c
c pz z z      . The innovation for 
y
t  and 
c
t  are related in the form of the right-hand 
expression of equation (*). 
Second, we assume the consumption process is subject to the consumption shock ct  in addition to 
the full-impact from income shock yt . The consumption shock is purely exogenous to the 
optimization process. 
Third, we assume that the impact of the transitory shock to income of one country can be fully 
eliminated through financial arrangements internationally at least in an ideal condition. This is 
achieved by minimizing the conditional variance  1vart tc   through choosing the value of   
equal to unity. 
To see this, note that the above equations can be written as 
 
   
 
     
1 0 1 01 1 0 1
1 1 1 11 1 1
y y
t y yt t
t tc c
t c c c c ct t
y L L
c L L L L L
  
 
       
             
                               
 
Then    22 2 21var 1t t y cc          , which is minimized by choosing 1  . 
The actual value of   is of course influenced by the availability of financial arrangements, which 
in turn is constrained by the degree of development of financial markets. So, we think it appropriate 
to measure a country’s degree of risk sharing by the magnitude of estimated value of  . 
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Comparison of the above model with those in the literature may give a further insight. 
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That is identical to the illustration of Hall’s (1978) random walk model of consumption by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
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which is exactly the measure of IRS proposed by Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 The UC measure of IRS 
We discuss both estimated regression and UC measures of IRS in this subsection. The results for 
these measures are presented in figures 3a to 3c. 
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The noticeable feature of results of regression measures is that they are not economically sensible. 
Looking at the results for advanced countries, they suggest that some most advanced countries, in 
particular the United States, UK, or Japan, share very small amount of income shocks 
internationally. In contrast, other least developing countries and emerging countries, e.g. Ghabon,  
Tunisia, Honduras, Trinidad & Tobago, Egypt, are able to internationally share much higher 
percentages of their income shocks. It is also seen from the results of regression measures that 
Greece and Switzerland appear to be able to share risks internationally better than other advanced 
counterparts. However, the figures for other highest-ranked emerging and developing countries 
also suggest that they have carried out IRS almost twice as well. The mean regression measures of 
IRS for advanced, emerging, and developing countries are 0.19, 0.28, and 0.40, respectively. 
In contrast with the above situation of regression measure, the results of UC measure of IRS appear 
to be intuitive and economically sensible. As can be seen from these figures, the UC measure 
suggests that the extent of IRS turns out to be better than previously thought, especially among 
advanced countries. Specifically, the average value of UC measure of IRS for advanced countries 
is 0.86. This number indicates that existing IRS mechanisms in advanced countries are able to 
eliminate 86 percent of an impact of an income shock on consumption. In contrast, emerging and 
developing countries are able to eliminate 68 ad 48 percent of an income shock on their 
consumption. 
Looking at individual results for the advanced country group, the UC measure suggests that 
Switzerland and Germany are better at sharing risks internationally than other advanced countries. 
These two countries have similar extents of IRS and are individually able to reduce 94 percent of 
the impact of an income shock on their consumption. The figure 2a also indicates that the United 
States, Netherlands, and Norway are able to eliminate 87 percent of an impact of an income shock 
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on their consumption. Other advanced countries have also obtained relatively high extents of IRS, 
such as 80 percent for Italy, 77 percent for Spain, and 75 percent for Greece. 
Relatively advanced emerging countries, such as South Korea, Israel, or Brazil are able to obtain 
the extents of IRS that are comparable to some lower-ranked advanced countries, for instance 
Greece’s or Spain’s. Lastly, the UC measure are available for only six developing countries in our 
study sample, whose magnitudes of UC measure appear to be relatively low. 
To summary, the UC measure of IRS suggests that advanced and a few emerging countries can 
internationally share income risks much better than what have been found in the literature. We 
now turn to providing possible explanations for the situation in the next section. 
3.2 Analyzing the order reversal puzzle 
In this subsection we investigate the potential sources of the puzzle with the regression measure 
of IRS. As we show previously, there are two puzzles. First, the estimated regression measures are 
found too small. Second, when estimated separately for each country using time series data, the 
measures are found smaller on average for advanced countries than for developing countries, 
implying that the latter achieve higher degree of international risk sharing than the former. 
We guess in the previous section that the first puzzle appears to be a result of the fact that tc  and 
ty  share the common random walk shock t , but we have not precisely pinned down the cause. 
For simplicity, we assume that     1y cz z   . From the form for 
 
 
   2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1cov ,
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  







 . When 
the permanent-transitory variance ratio becomes bigger, the regression measure of IRS will be 
smaller, given a value of  . We report empirical values of the ratio in table 1. As can be seen, 
advanced countries on average have much larger permanent income shock than other groups. In 
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contrast, developing countries have the smallest ratio. These empirical results suggest that the ratio 
very likely plays an important role in the conclusion of low extent of risk sharing found in the 
literature. 
The second possible explanation comes from the cointegration of consumption and income. 
Statistically, when income and consumption are not cointegrated,  cov , 0t tc y   . In this case, 
the regression measure of IRS tend to become larger due to smaller numerator. The empirical 
evidence of this theoretical result is also seen from table 1. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provide a new approach to measuring the extent of IRS for individual countries 
and pin down two possible causes for the low degree of risk sharing conclusion found in the 
literature. The new approach is based on an unobserved component model where an indicator for 
IRS is modeled to reduce a contemporaneous impact of income shock on consumption. The 
empirical results of the new measure suggest that the degrees of risk sharing for advanced countries 
and some emerging countries are relatively high. Finally, regression measure of IRS are shown to 







Table 1: Variance ratio and regression measure of IRS 
















Advance Econ. 4.64 0.81 21 - - 0 4.64 0.81 21
Emerging Econ. 1.93 0.75 12 - 0.67 9 1.93 0.72 21
Developing Econ. 0.45 0.62 6 - 0.59 21 0.45 0.60 27
Total 2.20 0.73 39 - 0.63 30 2.20 0.68 69
Notes: The cointegration test for each country was run with and without time trend component in the specification 
(Søren Johansen, 1988; Soren Johansen & Juselius, 1990). 
 
Figure 1: Regression measure of IRS 
 
Notes:  
1. The regression measure of IRS for one country is obtained from the regression 
     it t it t i i it t ity Y c C a b y Y           .  























Figure 3a: Regression measure and UC measure of IRS for advanced countries 
 
 
Figure 3b: Regression measure and UC measure of IRS for emerging countries 
 


































Figure 3c: Regression measure and UC measure of IRS for developing countries 
 




















































































































































Essay 3 : Conditions for Consumption Correlation Puzzle 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that an economic agent in one country can lessen the impact of a country-specific 
income shock on his consumption decision by engaging in asset transactions across countries. This 
so-called international risk sharing (IRS) is as fundamental as commodity transactions itself. The 
knowledge of a country’s temporal pattern of consumption not only has important welfare and 
policy implications to the country’s government but also to the works of global institutions 
(e.g.IMF (2013)), and economic research. 
However, it is very difficult to measure the extent of risk sharing for a country. Backus et al. (1992) 
propose a simple approach to compare the correlation of growth rate of consumption of two 
countries to correlation of income growth. The idea behind this simple approach is a simple 
pedagogical model of a pooling equilibrium. By putting income of all members together, each 
participant can enjoy a more stable consumption level over time than one can do individually. In 
such a case, the consumption growth fluctuation should come from the source not related to income 
fluctuations. Therefore, in full international risk sharing, the correlation of consumption growth 
must be 1 or much larger than correlation of income growth. 
Unfortunately, the empirical results observed in many countless countries are not what is expected. 
The consumption correlation (CC) is far from one while income correlation (IC) is relatively 
higher than consumption correlation even for a group of most advanced countries with massive 
international asset transactions. This result is well known in the literature as consumption 
correlation puzzle.  
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Two interpretations are possible. First, the degree of international risk sharing is actually low in 
reality even among advanced countries. Second, there is something missing with the proposed 
measure. We do not know with certainty which is the case. However, we suspect the second is 
more likely a culprit. In table 2, we summarize the correlation measure of IRS estimated from time 
series data of a variety of countries. What we find is starkly surprising. The unsurprising part is 
the puzzle remains applicable to all countries on average. The average CC and IC are 0.12 and 
0.18 for advanced economies, 0.05 and 0.08 for the emerging economies, and 0.05 and 0.07 for 
developing economies. However, the examining all possible pairwise CCs and ICs reveals that 
developing countries are more likely to observe a higher CC than IC among themselves while 
developed countries is the least likely. Moreover, an advanced country is more likely to have a 
higher CC than IC when pairing with a developing country than with an emerging counterpart. If 
we take these numbers literally, we have to say that the developing countries share income risks 
better on average than the advanced countries who also shares risks more often with developing 
countries, which is simply economically insensible. 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the above situation and provide economic conditions for 
the CC to hold. To do so, we base our argument on the classical permanent income hypothesis 
(PIH) and develop a model of the income and consumption processes in the form of bivariate 
unobserved component (UC) model. 
The extent of how much of the country-specific business cycle shocks of an individual country 
being prevented from affecting the level of consumption contemporaneously is, in our view, a 
reasonable measure of international risk sharing. The sufficient condition for risk sharing activities 
to happen is different business cycle conditions across countries. The fact is business cycles tend 
to be similar among countries within the same group while they are different between countries in 
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different economic groups likely contribute to the failure of the consumption correlation measure 
and the above empirical puzzle. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: In the next section we develop a framework to analyze 
risk sharing in the unobserved component model, and provide conditions for the consumption 
correlation. Section 3 reports the data analysis for our conditions. The last section provides a brief 
conclusion. 
2. An analytical framework for consumption correlation puzzle 
In this section, we first discuss the basic idea behind our models, and then discuss the conditions 
for having a larger CC than IC. 
2.1 Basic ideas 
We start our discussion with the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). Roughly speaking, for a 
country each of its income and consumption processes is expressed as the sum of the permanent 
and transitory components. The two processes share the common random walk process as their 
permanent components. Their transitory components are separate stationary processes but can be 
correlated.  
The permanent and transitory components of income and consumption of a representative agent in 
one country’s economy are like the trend and cycle components of the country’s income and 
consumption. In the absence of international financial transactions an individual can share 
individual specific idiosyncratic risks with his fellow citizens but cannot avoid the country-specific 
business cycle risks because they are systematic within the country’s economy. 
The representative agent model is more or less justifiable in one country’s economy since at least 
the country specific shocks to the trend and cycle processes are likely to be shared by most 
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members. This is partly because an economy is integrated to a large extent within a border and 
partly because the government can facilitate social programs including a variety forms of income 
transfers. 
When we look at income and consumption of different countries and allow cross border financial 
transactions, we need to have heterogeneous agent models. 
Financial markets integration alone cannot bring in the situation in which all different countries 
share a similar trend component of income and consumption unless the world is fiscally integrated 
and allows income transfers among countries. But the latter is politically quite difficult even within 
a small group of countries as witnessed by the current struggle of the EU nations. Given a current 
situation of the world, we assume that different countries have different long run income prospects 
or trend components and financial managements can only lessen an impact of the country specific 
business cycle on the transitory component of its consumption. Hence, what we expect from 
international risk sharing should not be an equalization of consumption growth rates among 
countries, which is implied by a simple pooling equilibrium idea, but a consumption smoothing of 
each country along its specific trend line. A low income growth country cannot obtain a high 
growth rate of consumption through international financial arrangement but can lessen temporal 
fluctuations of consumption from its own (low) growth trend. 
2.2 Intra-national risk sharing 
We express income and consumption each as the sum of its permanent and transitory components 












where ty   and tc  are log of per capita income and consumption, respectively, and each of the 
permanent components is an I(1) and each of transitory components is an I(0) process. Also, 
assume innovations to the permanent and transitory components are uncorrelated for income and 
consumption. 
In the absence of IRS, only individual income shocks are diversifiable while country-specific 
business cycle and permanent shocks are not due to their systematic natures. We set for i-th 




i y y i
t t t t
i y y i
t t t i t




   
   
  
   
  
  
where it  is zero mean auto-regressive processes of degree yp , 
y
t  indicates country-specific 
business cycle, βi indicates the measure of risk sharing for the individual. 
From this structure, we get  
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2.3 International risk sharing 
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In the case of IRS, business cycle becomes diversifiable risks thanks to different business cycles 
across countries. We set, for any two countries i  and j , income and consumption to share a similar 
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We then get 
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which is observably larger than 1. 
Let  ,y I JIJ t tcorr y y      and  ,c I JIJ t tcorr c c     
We then have the following conditions 
A. 0
IJ
   is sufficient for y cIJ IJ 
   
B. Suppose 0
IJ
   
a. If 0
IJ
  , then y cIJ IJ 
   
b. Suppose 0
IJ
  , IJ IJ
    is sufficient for y cIJ IJ 
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 i.e.    , ,I J I Jcorr corr    . 
2.4 Conclusions 
If a given country’s business cycle is more correlated to the world business cycle than its trend is 
correlated to the world trend, then this country’s income growth tends to be more correlated to that 
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of the rest of the countries than its consumption growth is correlated to that of the rest of the 
countries. 
Probably a most important factor that would make the correlation of income across countries larger 
than that of consumption despite the presence of high degrees of IRS is large positive correlation 
of business cycles across countries. In other words, it is a world business cycle. 
3. Empirical evidence 
We report in this section the empirical results of the above theoretical arguments. The results are 
presented in tables 2 to 5. 
The noticeable result is that the conditions (A) and (Ba) do not hold well in the whole sample. 
However, they do hold relatively well within the group that meets the conditions. The economic 
meaning of condition (A) is that countries should have different business cycles to facilitate risk-
sharing activities, leading to a larger consumption correlation than income correlation. In the real 
world, however, studies have shown that business cycles among advanced countries are relatively 
synchronized (see, for example M. A. Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003)). This is likely the cause 
of the limited applicability of the correlation measure while provides a possible explanation for 
the limited occurrence of larger consumption correlation than income correlation among advanced 
countries seen in Table 2. 
Condition (Bb) is a theoretically interesting result. As seen in table 4, the condition holds very well 
for country groups where the condition is met. However, it does not hold for a larger share of the 
sample. Results shown in table 5 indicates that country groups, where a larger income correlation 
than consumption correlation is observed, experience larger correlations of trend and cycles than 
the group without this feature. Therefore, direct empirical evidence for condition (Bb) is obviously 
29 
 
scarce, results in table 5 suggest certain role to play of the world business cycle in the consumption 
correlation puzzle. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the consumption correlation measure and the 
empirical fact in observed data. The sufficient condition is when countries experience different 
business cycles. Moreover, the world business cycle likely plays a role in the consumption 
correlation puzzle. Empirical results suggest that these conditions hold relatively well within the 
groups where these conditions are found valid. 
While supports for these conditions are scarce, these conditions offer new directions from which 
they can be extended and gain further insights into the consumption correlation puzzle. Data 
analysis indicates that the first and second moments of income growth and consumption growth 
are markedly different between country groups where opposite relationship between income and 
consumption correlations are observed and where cointegration is found (see tables 7 and 8). 
Moreover, there are substantial differences in these moments across countries within the group 
where consumption correlation is larger than income correlation. The general conclusion from 
comparing first and second moments of income and consumption growth of country pairs with 
c y    and those with c y   is that within the former group the first moment of income 
and consumption growth are larger while the second moments of these variables are smaller. This 
observation suggests that the causes of consumption correlation puzzle could be found by 
removing identical countries assumption in the canonical model and allowing consumption and 




Table 2: Summary of consumption and income correlation  
 AEs EEs DEs Total 
c      
AEs 0.28 0.02 0.05 0.12 
EEs 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.05 
DEs 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
     
y       
AEs 0.38 0.08 0.09 0.18 
EEs 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.08 
DEs 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.07 
     
 1 c yN N        
AEs 0.18 0.33 0.42 0.31 
EEs 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.40 
DEs 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.45 
 
 
Table 3: Condition (A)  
 AEs EEs DEs World 
 A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N) 
AEs 2 1 2 2 2 2   
EEs   3 2    1 
DEs     2 1  1 
 
 S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%) 
AEs 67 33 50 50 50 50   
EEs   60 40    100 
DEs     67 33  100 
Note:  
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     in (A1+A2) for respective row and 
column country group. 




     in (A1+A2) for respective row and 





Table 4: Condition (Ba)  
 AEs EEs DEs World 
 A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N)   
AEs     1 1   
EEs         
DEs     1 0   
 
 S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%)   
AEs     50 50   
EEs         
DEs     100 0   
 
Note:  
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 in (A1+A2) for respective 
row and column country group. 
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 in (A1+A2) for respective 
row and column country group. 
 
Table 5: Condition (Bb)  
 AEs EEs DEs World 
 A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N) A1 (N) A2 (N)   
AEs 1     1   
EEs   1      
DEs     1    
 
 S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%) S1 (%) S2 (%)   
AEs 100     100   
EEs   100      






















































in (A1+A2) for respective 
row and column country group. 
















in (A1+A2) for respective 
row and column country group. 
 
 
Table 6: Comparison of correlation of cycles and trends for groups of y c    and  
y c    
y c     y c    
 AEs EEs DEs   AEs EEs DEs 
 corr ,I J        corr ,I J     
AEs 0.20 0.06 -0.03 AEs 0.39 0.17 0.09
EEs  0.02 -0.11 EEs  0.14 0.08
DEs   0.02 DEs  -0.06
Total 0.10 0.00 -0.04 Total 0.21 0.13 0.04
         
 corr ,I J        corr ,I J     
AEs 0.98 0.97 0.32 AEs 0.98 0.96 0.71
EEs  0.94 0.48 EEs  0.96 0.56
DEs   0.05 DEs  0.67






Table 7: Mean and variance ratios of income and consumption growth 
 
it jty y      it jtV y V y  it jtc c     it jtV c V c  y   c  
   , ,it jt it jtcorr c c corr y y            
AEs 1.34 0.20 1.30 0.09 0.00 0.12
EEs 1.37 0.43 1.31 0.31 -0.01 0.10
Des 0.96 1.18 0.95 1.26 -0.02 0.13
Total 1.05 0.98 1.04 1.01 -0.02 0.12
        
   , ,it jt it jtcorr c c corr y y            
AEs 1.22 0.27 1.20 0.13 0.20 0.05
EEs 1.28 0.50 1.24 0.36 0.12 -0.01
Des 0.89 1.24 0.91 1.26 0.15 0.00
Total 0.97 1.04 0.99 1.02 0.16 0.00
 
Table 8: Mean and variances of consumption and income across countries with and without 
cointegration 
 it jty y      it jtV y V y   it jtc c      it jtV c V c   
 NC C NC C NC C NC C 
   , ,it jt it jtcorr c c corr y y      
AEs 2.08 1.00 0.14 0.32 1.96 0.98 0.06 0.18 
EEs 2.12 1.01 0.31 0.74 1.96 0.97 0.21 0.62 
Des 1.53 0.72 0.83 1.92 1.46 0.73 0.82 2.43 
Total 1.67 0.79 0.69 1.59 1.58 0.79 0.66 1.95 
   , ,it jt it jtcorr c c corr y y      
AEs 1.94 0.93 0.18 0.47 1.88 0.93 0.08 0.28 
EEs 2.07 0.99 0.34 0.82 1.94 0.97 0.22 0.75 
Des 1.44 0.67 0.87 2.12 1.43 0.69 0.81 2.64 
Total 1.57 0.74 0.72 1.77 1.54 0.75 0.65 2.13 
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